

## Message Text

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21

ACTION NEA-10

INFO OCT-01 AF-06 EUR-12 IO-11 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00

PM-04 H-02 INR-07 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01

SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 OMB-01 SAM-01 SAB-01 AID-05 /094 W

----- 102299

P R 021805Z MAR 76

FM AMEMBASSY RABAT

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7894

INFO AMEMASSY ADDIS ABABA

AMEMBASSY ALGIERS

AMEMBASSY AMMAN

AMEMBASSY DAKAR

AMEMBASSY MADRID

AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY TANANARIVE

AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI

AMEMBASSY TUNIS

USMISSION USUN

AMCONSUL CASABLANCA

AMCONSUL TANGIER

USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GERMANY

CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON

FOSIF ROTA

COMSIXTHFLT

C O N F I D E N T I A L RABAT 1226

USCINCEUR AND CINCUSNAVEUR ALSO FOR POLADS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR PBOR MO SS SP MR AG

SUBJECT: SAHARA ROUNDUP

1. KING RESPONDS TO QADHAFI. KING RECEIVED LIBYAN AMBASSADOR

FEB. 28 FOR WHAT OFFICIAL NEWS AGENCY MAP CALLED "CORDIAL

TALK." KING GAVE ENVOY COPY OF PERSONAL MESSAGE TO QADHAFI WHICH

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WAS IN RESPONSE TO LATTER'S EARLIER MESSAGE (TRIPOLI 0271).

2. MESSAGE, TAKING CUE FROM QADHAFI, LEANED HEAVILY ON CAREFULLY SELECTED KORANIC PARABLES. UNLIKE QADHAFI'S MESSAGE, HOWEVER, IT WAS DRIPPING WITH SARCASM. KING WROTE THAT WHILE SOME PASSAGES IN QADHAFI'S MESSAGE WORTHY OF ANSWER, HE REGRETTED THAT OTHERS HAD TO BE DISMISSED. REGARDING QADHAFI'S 1972 DECLARATION THAT HE READY WAGE HOLY WAR TO LIBERATE SAHARA, GOM HAD NOT ANSWERED BECAUSE ARAB BROTHER'S OFFER TO HELP ANOTHER ARAB BROTHER DID NOT NEED REPLY. SECONDLY, QADHAFI IN HIS 1972 MESSAGE HAD "CONFERRED ON HIMSELF" CLAIM THAT HE A SAHARAN. AS TO QADHAFI'S 1973 CLAIM THAT WAR OF LIBERATION WAS TAKING PLACE IN SAHARA, KING SAID THIS UNTRUE BECAUSE POLISARIO WAS OF SPANISH ORIGIN. KING CLAIMED TO BE IN POSSESSION OF EVIDENCE "PROVING" INTENTION OF SPANISH COMMUNISTS TO TURN SAHARA INTO COMMUNIST BASE FOR REVOLUTIONAY MOVEMENT, AS IN PORTUGAL. AS TO QADHAFI'S COMPLAINT THAT LIBYAN ARMS TO SAHARANS WERE CONFISCATED IN 1973, KING CALLED ATTENTION TO FACT THAT IT WAS NOT MOROCCO WHICH CONFISCATED THOSE ARMS (I.E., ALGERIANS DID IT). KING AGREED WITH MU'AMMAR THAT SITUATION NOW EXTREMELY DANGEROUS BUT SAID REASON NOT ANYONE'S TERRITORIAL ANNEXATION BUT ALGERIAN INTERVENTION. ALGERIA NOW MOBILIZING IN ORDER TO TAKE CONTROL OF SAHARA. AS FOR SAHARA REFUGEE CAMPS, HE CHARGED THAT ALGERIANS HAD DRIVEN MANY SAHARANS THERE BY THREATS AND INTIMIDATION. FOR PROPAGANDA PURPOSES ALGERIA HAD THROWN IN OTHER TRIBES WHICH HAD NO LINKS WITH SAHARA BUT CAME EITHER FROM ALGERIA OR FROM DROUGHT-STRICKEN AREAS OF NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES. KING RENEWED INVITATION TO QADHAFI TO VISIT SAHARA SO THAT HE COULD SEPARATE "WHEAT FROM WEEDS." HE HAD BEEN "VERY PLEASED" TO LEARN OF UNITY BETWEEN LIBYA AND ALGERIA. HOPED LIBYA WOULD SERVE TO BRING ALGERIAN GOVERNMENT "BACK TO SENSES." AT SAME TIME, KING SUGGESTED QADHAFI TAKE CARE TO AVOID "DECEPTION" MOROCCO HAS EXPERIENCED IN ITS OWN DEALINGS WITH ALGERIA.

3. ATHERTON VISIT. ASSTSECSTATE ATHERTON ARRIVED CASABLANCA EVENING MARCH 1 FROM ALGIERS AND WAS FLOWN IMMEDIATELY BY GOM AIRCRAFT TO FES TO MEET WITH KING. THERE FOLLOWED WORKING DINNER WITH KING AND PRINCIPAL ADVISORS. SEMI-CONFIDENTIAL

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OFFICIAL PRESS FRONT-PAGED BRIEF MAP ITEM ON VISIT, ALONG WITH MORE PROMINENT ITEMS ON OAU, PREPARATIONS FOR THRONE DAY, AND QADHAFI MESSAGE.

4. OAU COMMENTARY. SEMI-OFFICIAL PRESS UNIFORMLY WELCOMED ALGERIAN "DEFEAT" AT ADDIS ABABA. WHILE PRESS HAD PREPOTED THAT MEMBER STATES AGREED TO DECIDE FOR THEMSELVES AS TO ATTITUDE TOWARD SDAR, NO DETAILS OF ACTUAL COMPROMISE REPORTED

(SEE ADDIS ABABA 2535 NOTAL).

5. SDAR RECOGNITIONS. LOCAL PRESS HAS YET TO REPORT RECOGNITION OF SDAR BY MADAGASCAR AND BURUNDI (USUN 0776 NOTAL). SECSTATE MFA CHERKAOUI MARCH 1 DISMISSED RECOGNITION BY THESE GOVERNMENTS AS INCONSEQUENTIAL, NOTING POINTEDLY THAT GOM HAD NO RELATIONS WITH THESE COUNTRIES ANYWAY.

6. CRITICISM OF SPAIN. FIRST PRESS CRITICISM OF SPAIN FOR SOME TIME APPEARED IN FEB. 28 EDITORIAL IN USFP'S AL MUHARRIR. EDITORIAL SAID IT NOT A "SIMPLE COINCIDENCE" THAT ON EVE OF WITHDRAWAL FROM SAHARA, SPANIARDS HAD ADOPTED "STRANGE ATTITUDE" TOWARDS JEMAA. EDITORIAL PREDICTED THAT THIS ATTITUDE SIGNALLED RESUMPTION OF "MADRID MANEUVERS" WHICH HAVE BEEN GOING ON FOR PAST FEW YEARS AND WARNED THAT GOM WOULD HAVE TO BE CAREFUL OF SPAIN SINCE GOS MIGHT ATTEMPT RAISE TENSIONS IN AREA FOR ITS ENDS.

7. COMMENT. KING'S MESSAGE TO QADHAFI, WHICH HIGHLY SARCASTIC IN TONE, IS NEVERTHELESS INTERESTING IN THAT IT TOUCHES ON MOST ELEMENTS OF GOM'S PRESENT POSITION. THE CHARGE THAT ALGERIA HAS OUTRIGHT TERRITORIAL AMBITIONS FOR SAHARA HAS BEEN RECURRNET IN GOM MEDIA OUTPUT IN RECENT DAYS. THIS OBVIOUSLY DESIGNED TO DISCREDIT SDAR, AS WELL AS TO ACCENTUATE WHAT GOM PORTRAYS AS GROWNING ISOLATION OF ALGERIA. CONDESCENDING USE OF QADHAFI CHANNEL TO PUT ACROSS KING'S IDEAS NO DOUBT SEEMS ESPECIALLY KEYED TO ARAB BYSTANDERS.

8. IT UNCLEAR HOW GOM WILL REACT TO FUTURE RECOGNITION OF SDAR BY STATES WITH WHICH IT HAS MORE SIGNIFICANT LINKS THAN WITH MALAGACY REPUBLIC AND BURUNDI. WHILE POSSIBILITY OF GOM'S SEVERING TIES WITH STATES RECOGNIZING SDAR MIGHT SERVE TO HOLD OFF SOME POTENTIAL RECOGNITIONS, GOM WILL BE FACED WITH CONFIDENTIAL

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DIFFICULT CHOICE IN THE CASE OF STATES WITH WHICH IT HAS IMPORTANT INTERESTS.  
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## Message Attributes

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